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This is a description of the labor market sector in the dynamic medium term macroeconomic 
model KIMOD developed at the National Institute of Economic Research (NIER).  
 
Unemployment is caused by matching inefficiencies of the type described by C. Pissarides in 
Equilibrium Unemployment, 2000. Unemployed workers and firms with vacant jobs are 
engaged in costly search for a profitable match. Total hirings from unemployment into 
employment depend on the number of unemployed workers and vacant jobs. Flows into 
unemployment come from new entrants into the labor force and from exogenous separation of 
matched job – worker pairs.  
 
Wages are set in individual negotiations between the worker and the firm in a match, 
according to the Nash bargaining solution. Some inertia in real wages follows from 
unemployment benefits being indexed to the previous period’s market wage.  
 
These features lead to an unemployment rate which adjusts with some inertia towards a long 
run equilibrium level. Turnover costs provide some incentives for labor hoarding by firms 
during temporary downturns. The effects on the economy from variations in hours worked 
due to variations in the labor force are distinct from those due to variations in average 
working time.  
 
The model is used to estimate the equilibrium unemployment level in Sweden from Swedish 
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Introduction 
 
The National Institute of Economic Research (NIER) develops and maintains the medium 
term macroeconomic model KIMOD. This paper describes the labor market sector of that 
model.  
 
KIMOD is a dynamic general equilibrium macroeconomic model of the Swedish economy to 
be used for aggregate economic-policy analysis and medium-range macroeconomic scenarios. 
The model was used for the first time in the NIER's ongoing activities during the work on the 
Wage Formation Report for 2003.  
 
The model is highly aggregated, with a business sector producing one private good, a public 
sector producing a public good, a foreign sector, and a central bank with an inflation target. 
All firms in the model are identical, as are all households. In addition, the government sector 
is consolidated and thus not separated into central, regional and local government. The model 
is based on microeconomic foundations in the sense that firms and households make optimal 
decisions on output and consumption, respectively, given rational expectations about the 
behavior of other agents and about the future development of the model as a whole.  
 
It is dynamic, both in the sense that investments and savings during a period affect future 
possibilities for output and consumption, respectively, and in that all agents take this into 
account in their decisions. Time is divided into discrete periods of one year. The projections 
generated by the model are thus time series with yearly frequency, so the econometric 
equations of the model are estimated on the basis of annual data. The National Accounts are 
the preferred data source for initial data and for estimating parameters.  
 
Prices in each period are set so that supply is equal to demand on all markets except on the 
labor market. In the long run, the model approaches a steady state path that is independent of 
the initial state of the economy. In this steady state, the economy is on a balanced growth path 
with a constant relative growth rate.  
 
KIMOD is intended for use in macroeconomic analysis and in medium range scenarios, with a 
time horizon of two to six years. For other time horizons, the lower limit of usability for the 
model results from the fact that the length of periods is set at one year. This means that there 
are no seasonal dynamics, and that data for parts of the current year cannot be used as the 
initial state for the model. For long range purposes, the usability of the model is limited by 
insufficient modeling of demography and other structural developments.  
 
This report gives a thorough treatment of the labor market in KIMOD. It is modeled as a 
matching market, where unemployed workers and firms with vacant jobs are engaged in 
costly and time consuming search for a profitable match. Wages are set in individual 
negotiations between matched pairs of employers and employees, with some bargaining 
power on both sides.  
 
Unemployment arises both from search related friction and from imperfect competition in 
wage formation. While friction by itself would create unemployment, the wage setting 
mechanism also contributes to the determination of the unemployment level.  
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Growth in the labor force and labor productivity is exogenous. Firms and workers maximize 
their expected profits and utility, discounted by the exogenous interest rate. Workers gain 
utility from consumption only.  
 
The labor market theory builds largely on Pissarides (2000). The overlapping generations 
model of the households is based on Blanchard (1985) and on the discrete time treatment in 




Growth in labor force and productivity 
 
Growth in productivity and the labor force are the exogenous sources of long run growth in 
other variables. Production and capital follow their combined growth rate while real wages 
grow with productivity.  
 
The number of workers in the labor force, which is the entire population of this model, is an 
exogenous time series Nt growing at rate nt between period t-1 and t. In steady state the 
growth rate is constant.  
 
(1)  1 tt t Nn N − =  
 
In the production function (12) bellow, the labor input is scaled by a productivity factor Ht, 
which grows at a constant rate h.  
 






Over a period t, the labor force Nt consists of the number of employed workers Lt and 
unemployed workers Ut.  
 
(3)  tt t LU N += 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the flows of labor into and out of the labor force, and between 
employment and unemployment, between period t-1 and t. Between any period t-1 and t, πNt-1 
survive into the next period, (1-π)Nt-1 die (or retire out of the labor force) proportionally out 
of employment and unemployment, while (nt-π)Nt-1 enter the labor force as unemployed. The 
net growth rate of the labor force is thus a factor nt.  
 
Within each period, jobs expire, because of lay-offs or quits, at an exogenous separation rate 
s, resulting in a flow sLt of workers from employment to unemployment. In the other 
direction, there is a flow Xt of workers hired into employment. Since all jobs are identical, 
employed workers have no incentive to search for other jobs. Hence labor flows between 
different kinds of employment without intermediate unemployment spells are not modeled.  
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Hirings Xt depend on the number of unemployed workers Ut and open vacancies Vt according 
to a matching function x, increasing in both arguments and linearly homogenous.  
 
(4)  Xt = x(Ut, Vt) 
 




0 tt t X xU V
η η − =  
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Define q(ϑt) as the rate at which vacancies are filled. Using (5), q can be expressed in terms 















This also means that the rate at which unemployed workers find jobs is:  
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Figure 1   8
 
The flow of workers into employment and unemployment is given by either of the following 
two equations.  
 
(8)  1 () tt t t t LLs L q V π ϑ − =− +  
 
(9)  11 () ( ) ttt ttt t UU n Ns L q V π πϑ −− =+ − + −  
 
The equations (8) and (9) are equivalent formulations of the employment dynamics, since 
their sum is the population dynamics (1). Equation (8) is used further on as a restriction (16) 
on the individual firm's employment decision. The dynamics of the employment rate follow 
from (9) using the definition (3) and the growth rate (1) of the labor force.  
 
(10) 















In steady state, unemployment and the labor force growth rate is constant, so the steady state 


















The steady state relation (11) is a static negative relationship between unemployment and 
vacancies. It is often referred to as the Beveridge curve when plotted in a diagram with 





The position of the economy along the Beveridge curve indicate how demand and supply 




Figure 2   9
vacancy rate, and hence high ϑt, in a tight labor market, and vice versa in a recession. The 
position of the Beveridge curve is considered to depend mainly on structural parameters 
determining the functioning of the labor market in the long run. However, the separation rate 
s, though constant in this model, would in a richer model increase in downturns and thus shift 
the Beveridge curve outward.  
 
The equation (10) for unemployment dynamics, which might be called the dynamic Beveridge 
curve, describes the adjustment paths of the labor market in response to shocks. Typically 
these paths describe counter clockwise loops around the static Beveridge curve, converging to 






Each firm i produces its output Yt
i using its capital stock Kt
i and labor force εt Lt
i, equal to the 
number of its employed workers Lt
i times the number of hours εt worked per worker and year, 
which is the same for all firms. It uses a technology given by the production function F, 
increasing in both arguments and linearly homogenous.  
 
(12)  (, )
ii i
tt t t t YF K H L ε =  
 
Ht is the exogenous labor productivity factor, growing at a constant rate according to (2). The 
workers are homogenous, so εt and Ht are the same for all firms. Working hours εt are either 
constant or enter as an exogenous time series. Typical functional forms for the production 
function are the Cobb-Douglas or the CES forms. Presently, KIMOD has a production 
function of the Cobb-Douglas form:  
 
 
1 () ( )
ii i
tt t t t YKH L
α α ε
− =  
 
Firms are assumed to be large enough for their number of new hirings each period to be equal 
to its expected value, while still small enough to behave competitively on the product and 
capital markets. Thus firms take as given the price Pt
p per unit of their produced good and the 
price Pt
I per unit of the investment good in time period t, and the nominal interest rate Rt from 
period t to t+1.  
 
Wages are set in negotiations, described bellow, between the individual firm and worker in a 
match. This means that the negotiated wage is specific to the match, but since all firms and 
workers are alike, the outcome of all negotiations will be the same wage level Wt. This is an 
hourly nominal wage which is multiplied by the number of hours worked εt per worker and 
year to obtain a worker’s yearly nominal wage εt Wt. Wage negotiations precede the firms’ 
other decisions each period, so that the negotiated wage for the current period is given in the 
firms’ optimization problem. After firms and workers have agreed on a wage, each firm 
chooses its investment It
i and its number of open vacancies Vt
i to maximize the present value 
of its profits, taking the wage Wt as given.  
 
Each period t, the firm earns revenue Pt
p Yt
i from sales of its product. It pays wages εt Wt Lt
i to 
the workers and an employer’s wage tax τt
e εt Wt Lt
i to the government. It also invests in new 
capital at a cost Pt
I It
i (1 + ψ It
i / Kt
i) proportional to the price of the investment good and   10
increasing quadratically in the investment level. Finally, it recruits new workers by opening 
vacancies at a cost γ (1+τt
e) εt Wt Vt
i proportional to the current wage, reflecting that 
recruitment is a labor intensive task. Firms do not accumulate financial assets, so the remains 
are paid out as dividends Dt
i to shareholders according to (13).  
 
(13)  (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
i
iy i I i e i e i t
tt tt t t t t t t t t t i
t
I
DP YP I W L W V
K
ψτ ε γ τ ε = −+− + − +  
 
Given the series of nominal interest rates Rt, the discount factor ρt
s from period s to an earlier 
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contrast to aggregate economic variables, such as Ht, ϑt, and εt, which are beyond the 
individual firm’s control. Summing the firm specific variables over the index i yields the 
corresponding aggregate variables Yt, Kt, Lt, It, Vt, Dt and Πt. The distinction is especially 
important for variables which enter into the firm’s decision problem, because if, for example, 
it could control not only its own vacancies Vt
i but all vacancies Vt in the economy, it would 
have a monopsony on the labor market and could in effect decide the unemployment rate. 
However, with identical firms, aggregate variables will equal the firm specific ones times the 
number of firms.  
 
The firm’s budget restriction (13) holds for the corresponding aggregate variables also. The 
vacancy costs reduce the output given by the production function, so the value added in the 




tt t t t t t VA P Y WV γτ ε =− +  
 
The firm accumulates capital according to the following dynamics, with a constant 
depreciation rate δ.  
 
(15)  1 (1 )
ii i
tt t KK I δ + =− + 
 
By opening vacancies, a firm controls its labor force according to the following employment 
dynamics, which is a firm specific version of (8). The vacancy filling rate q(ϑt) depends on 
aggregate tightness ϑt, which is given in the firm’s optimization problem.  
 
(16)  1 ()
ii i i
tt t t t LL s L q V πϑ − =− +  
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The firm's decision problem is to choose investments It
i and vacancies Vt
i each period to 
maximize its profits (14) subject to the technology (12), the budget (13), and the laws of 
motion (15) and (16) for capital and labor respectively. The following first order conditions 
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Since the same first order conditions (17) and (18) holds for all firms, the firm index i in these 
equations can be dropped to obtain the dynamic equations for aggregate demand for capital 
and labor. Some simplifying definitions help to make these equations more readable. First 
introduce the following abbreviations for the partial derivatives of the production function in 
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Using the definitions (19), (20), and (21), the first order conditions (17) and (18) can now be 
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In steady state, the marginal productivity of capital is constant, as is the investments to capital 
ratio, the relative price of investment goods to output goods, and labor market tightness. The 
marginal productivity of labor and the real wage both grow at the rate h. Thus, the steady state 
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The steady state labor demand equation (25) is shown below in figure 3 as a negative 
relationship between the labor market tightness ϑt and the real marginal wage costs per unit of 








The matching market described so far may be combined with several alternative wage setting 
mechanisms. Candidates for wage setting agents are central or local unions, firms, perhaps 
taking efficiency wage effects into account, or various forms of bargaining between these 
agents.  
 
The wage setting mechanism assumed here is that individual wages for each period are set in 
local negotiations between the worker and the firm in a match in the beginning of the period. 
The outcome of the negotiations is given by the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, with 
bargaining power β for the worker and 1-β for the firm. The rationale behind the Nash 




wt / (F’L,t Ht )  13
along with possible interpretations of the bargaining power parameter are found in Binmore 
et. al. (1986).  
 
The outcome of the wage negotiations depends on how firms and workers value all possible 
outcomes, including agreements on different wage levels as well as breakdown of the 
negotiations. A worker compares his utility as employed at a certain wage to that of being 
unemployed, while a firm compares its marginal profits from employing an additional worker 
at a certain wage to the costs and benefits of a vacancy.  
 
The value functions below give these values of the parties in case of successful or 
unsuccessful bargaining, and show how, in the former case, they depend on the individually 








t are respectively the value of vacancies and filled 





t indicate that these values depend on the specific wage Wt
i considered in 
negotiations within a certain firm-worker pair, which must be distinguished, in the reasoning 
around the bargaining situation, from the equilibrium outcome Wt of all negotiations.  
 
The Nash bargaining solution requires that the parties’ object functions be specified as their 
von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility. Firms are taken to be risk neutral profit 
maximizers of profits as specified by (14). In the present state of the model, workers are 
assumed to derive utility only from consumption with a constant intertemporal marginal rate 
of substitution of one. Furthermore, since the model is deterministic, risk preferences may be 
arbitrarily assigned. Here, workers are assumed to be risk neutral, which is the simplest case. 
Under these circumstances, the worker’s discounted lifetime income measures his money 
metric expected utility, and the value functions are computed as contributions to this measure.  
 




t are the marginal contributions to its profits from 
having a worker employed on a job this period at a wage Wt
i or, respectively, to keep an 




t are the 
contributions to its lifetime income from holding a job this period at a wage Wt
i or, 
respectively, to be unemployed until the next period.  
 
Employed workers work εt hours a year at the wage Wt, thus earning a yearly nominal wage of 
εt Wt. Unemployed workers receive unemployment transfers Tt. Workers pay a proportional 
wage tax τt
w on wages as well as unemployment benefits. In addition, firms pay an employer’s 
tax τt
e on all wage costs.  
 
A firm with a vacant job in period t thus bears the cost γ (1 + τt
e) εt Wt of the vacancy this 
period. Next period it expect to fill it with probability q(ϑt), according to (6), or else remain 
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A firm with a filled job earns the marginal product of labor this period, while also paying this 
period’s negotiated wage plus taxes (1 + τt
e) εt Wt
i. Next period it runs the risk to loose the 
employee by death with probability 1-π, or by separation, with probability π s, or else remains 
with the filled job with probability π(1-s). In the latter case, the wage will be renegotiated the   14
next period, with that period’s market wage as the expected outcome, i.e. an individual 
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Workers pay a proportional wage tax τt
w on wages and unemployment benefits. They buy a 
consumption good priced at Pt
c and pay a value added tax of τt
c on all consumption. They 
therefore discount future income with the consumer price real interest rate rt





















An unemployed worker earns unemployment benefits after tax (1 - τt
w) Tt this period. He 
survives into the next period with probability π, and in that case expect to find a job at the 
going market wage with probability ϑt q(ϑt), as given by (7), or to remain unemployed with 






















Finally, an employed worker earns his negotiated wage (1 - τt
w) εt Wt
i this period. He survives 
into the next period with probability π, and in that case expects to be separated from his 
present employer into unemployment with probability s, or else to keep his job with 
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Subtract (26) from (27) and (29) from (30) and drop the firm index i to obtain the respective 









requirement that both of these value gains be non-negative determines the parties’ respective 
reservation wages, between which the wage agreement is bound to fall.  
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t = 0  
 
From (26) and (35) follows  
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(1 ) (1 )
()
e











Now, the Nash bargaining solution requires that the negotiations settle on the wage that 
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The first order condition for the Nash bargaining solution requires that the following 
condition holds for the wage bargaining outcome. The derivatives of the value functions are 
eliminated using (31) and (32). Since all firm-worker pairs are alike, the wage level will be 
the same throughout the whole economy, so the index i is now dropped.  
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t and the corresponding values for period t+1 can now be 
eliminated from the system (33), (34), (35), (36), and (38), yielding the wage setting equation 
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The value τt+1 in the above equation measures the rate of increase from period t to t+1 in the 
wage tax wedge (1 + τt
e) / (1 - τt
w). It is defined by:  
 
(40) 
11 (1 ) /(1 )
(1 )













Of course future tax adjustments are relevant in the wage setting equation only to the extent 
that they are expected at the time of the negotiations.    16
 
In the absence of search externalities, the marginal product of labor and the unemployment 
benefits would be the firm's and worker's respective reservation wages. The wage cost 
corresponding to the negotiated wage is seen to be an average of these, weighted by the 
other's bargaining power, times a factor which adjusts for search costs, increasing in labor 
market tightness, strengthening the worker since the firm pays the vacancy cost. While the 
wage will never be set bellow the unemployment benefits, it may temporarily rise above the 
marginal product if the firm expects an increase in its labor demand in the near future, a kind 
of labor hoarding. In steady state, however, the wage will lie between the marginal product of 
labor and the unemployment benefits.  
 
If unemployment income Tt stays constant while productivity grows it will become negligible 
in the long run. More plausibly, it would grow at the same average rate as the other income 
variables. If interpreted as unemployment benefits, it would reasonably be indexed to the 
wage level. Here it is assumed to be indexed to the market wage in the previous period.  
 
(41)  Tt = λ εt-1 Wt-1  
 
This implies that the real unemployment benefit and therefore the real wage will be 














Inserting the assumption (41) into (39) and dividing through by Pt
y yields the real wage 
equation, which is further simplified using the abbreviated notation introduced in (19), (20), 
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In steady state, wt = h wt-1 i.e. the real wage grows at the rate h. Also, the tax system is 


















This completes the derivation of the equations which specify the dynamics and steady state of 
the model.  
 
The steady state labor demand equation (44) is shown in figure 4 below as a positive 
relationship between the labor market tightness ϑt and the real marginal wage costs per unit of 
the produced good wt / F’L,t H. Fewer unemployed workers searching and more open 
vacancies means higher competition for labor and thus higher real wages.  





Determination of equilibrium unemployment 
 
In order to obtain the equilibrium unemployment rate, the steady state equation system is 
solved recursively, beginning with the equilibrium value for labor market tightness ϑ*. First 
observe that the steady state versions of the labor demand equation (25) and the wage setting 
equation (44) both relate labor market tightness ϑt to the real marginal wage costs per unit of 
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Eliminating wage costs, and after some algebraic simplifications, this reduces to the following 
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In steady state, pt and rt are constant. The value of ϑt which satisfies the above equation is the 
equilibrium tightness ϑ*. This is illustrated graphically in figure 5, which combine the labor 
demand curve in figure 3 with the wage setting curve in figure 4. The intersection of the two 
curves determine the steady state values of real marginal wage costs per unit good and labor 





wt / (F’L,t Ht )  18
 
 
To determine the equilibrium unemployment rate u*, substitute this equilibrium tightness ϑ* 
for ϑt in the steady state version of the Beveridge curve (11). The equilibrium vacancy rate is 
then simply v* = u* ϑ*. Graphically, in the diagram of the Beveridge curve, with 
unemployment ut on the horizontal and vacancies vt on the vertical axis, the equilibrium labor 
market tightness ϑ* = vt / ut describes a straight line through the origin. Figure 6 shows this 




The intersection of the tightness line with the Beveridge curve determine the equilibrium 
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Other endogenous steady state variables follow recursively from tightness and unemployment. 
Given the total labor force Nt, equilibrium unemployment u* determines steady state 
employment (1-u*) Nt and, for a given capital stock, the marginal product of labor is 
determined by the production function. The wage level, finally, follows from either the wage 




Estimating the Beveridge curve, tightness, and equilibrium unemployment 
 
In order to aid calibration of the model parameters, and to determine a reasonable value for 
the equilibrium unemployment rate, the Beveridge curve and the labor market tightness line in 
figure 6 above are estimated using Swedish data on unemployment and vacancies. Both 
variables are yearly time series from 1962 to 2002, and expressed as fractions of the labor 
force. The data is tabled in Appendix C, and plotted in figures 7 and 8 bellow.  
 































As is evident from figure 7, unemployment rises sharply in the beginning of the 1990’s, to 
decrease rather slowly towards earlier levels. Yet, while in the period 1962-1991 
unemployment never reaches above 3.5 %, it never returns bellow that level in the later period 
1992-2002.    20
 
Figure 9 shows the unemployment and vacancy data from figure 7 and 8 combined into an 
empirical dynamic Beveridge curve comparable to the theoretical unemployment dynamics 
equation (10). The increase in unemployment in the last decade is seen as a large anti 
clockwise loop to the lower right in the diagram.  
 















One possible interpretation of the persistence of high unemployment is that it results from 
slow adjustment down towards low long run equilibrium levels, indicating a high degree of 
labor market inertia, possibly explainable by search friction of the type assumed in the 
theoretical matching model presented above. This corresponds to interpreting the large loop in 
figure 9 as an adjustment along the same long run Beveridge curve that lies behind the 
movements in earlier periods. On the other hand, the large difference in unemployment levels 
between the two periods might be the result of structural changes in the Swedish labor market 
in the beginning of the 90’s, reducing its efficiency in matching unemployed workers with 
vacant jobs. This corresponds to a shift outward of the Beveridge curve. An attempt is made 
to test for this possibility, by including a dummy variable for the later period in the 
estimations.  
 
The vacancy rate in figure 8 seems to exhibit a decreasing trend. For the latter part of the data 
period with increasing unemployment, this fits well with the unemployment increase, 
corresponding to a movement down along the Beveridge curve. However, vacancies seem to 
fall even early in the data period. This may be due to a transition of the labor force towards 
sectors with a lower tendency to report vacancies to the Swedish National Labor Market 
Administration, e.g. from blue collar to white collar jobs, from goods to services, and from 
the private to the public sector. In that case, it could present a problem for these estimations, 
which build on a theory implying a constant vacancy rate in steady state.  
 
The estimation method is single equation ordinary least squares regressions. The Beveridge 
curve is estimated using the following equation, which may be regarded as a version of the 
dynamic Beveridge curve (10) with vt / ut substituted for ϑt and solved for vt, and then 
linearized in logarithms. D9202 is a dummy variable for the period 1992-2002.  
 
(46)  0 1 1 2 1 3 9202 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) tt t t uu v D β βββ δ −− =+ + + +  
 
The corresponding static Beveridge curve analogous to (11) is    21
 
(47)  10 3 9 2 0 2 2 (1 )ln( ) ( ) ln( ) tt uDv β ββ β −= + +  
 
Labor market tightness is estimated using the following equation, which may be seen as a 
dynamic, linear variant of the steady state relationship (45).  
 
(48)  0 1 1 2 9202 ln( ) ln( ) tt t D ϑ γγϑ γ ε − =+ + +  
 
The implied steady state value of ϑ* is given by:  
 
(49) 












The estimated static equations for the Beveridge curve (47) and the labor market tightness 
(49) are combined, as illustrated in figure 6 above, to give the equilibrium unemployment rate 
u* expressed in terms of the regression parameters.  
 
(50) 
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For each of the two equations (46) and (48), two variants are estimated, one without and one 
with the dummy included. The four regressions are labeled as follows:  
 
 Label  Regression  equation  Dummy  included? 
  A1  Beveridge curve (46)   no 
  A2  Beveridge curve (46)   yes 
 B1  Tightness  (48)    no 
 B2  Tightness  (48)    yes 
 
Table 1 bellow presents the estimated parameters and the corresponding t-values of these four 
regressions.  
 
Table 1: Parameter estimates 
        
Parameter Estimate (t-value) Estimate (t-value) 
  A1   A2  
β0  0.373 (3.95)  0.556 (5.67) 
β1  0.509 (4.28)  0.205 (1.51) 
β2  -0.494 (3.88) -0.499 (4.47) 
β3     0.429  (3.48) 
       
  B1   B2  
γ0  -0.169 (1.40) -0.268 (2.05) 
γ1  0.890 (12.1)  0.692 (5.15) 
γ2     -0.548  (1.74) 
 
Table 2 presents the values of the equilibrium unemployment rate u* which follow from these 
parameter estimates according to equation (50). The two variants A1 and A2 of the Beveridge 
curve (46) may be combined with the two variants B1 and B2 of the tightness equation (48) in   22
four different ways, each with different values of the equilibrium unemployment rate. Except 
for the combination of A1 and B1, which contain no dummy variable in either equation, the 
equilibrium unemployment level differs between the earlier period 1962-1991 and the later 
period 1992-2002.  
 
Table 2: Equilibrium unemployment (%)
    
Estimations 1962-1991 1992-2002 
A1, B1  3,1  3,1 
A2, B2  2,2  6,0 
A1, B2  2,3  5,5 
A2, B1  2,8  3,9 
 
A choice between the different variants of the estimated equations may be based on the 
statistical significance of the estimated parameters of the dummy variable. The parameter β3 
for the dummy in estimation A2 differs from zero with a significance level of 1%. There thus 
seems to be some evidence for a shift outward of the Beveridge curve in the early 90’s. On the 
other hand, the parameter γ2 for the dummy in estimation B2 is not significantly different 
from zero even on a 5% level. Therefore, on the basis of these regressions there is no need to 
reject the hypothesis of a constant equilibrium level of labor market tightness during this 
period. Of the four combinations of Beveridge curve and tightness in table 2, the Beveridge 
curve A2, with a shift, combined with the constant equilibrium tightness B1 seem to fit the 
data better than the others. These two curves are plotted in figure 10. The conclusion is that 
out of the alternative estimates given, the most plausible estimate of the equilibrium 
unemployment rate for the period 1992-2002 is 3.9%.  
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Appendix A: Derivation of the wage setting equation 
 
Some further details of the algebraic derivation of the wage setting equation (39) are shown 
here.  
 















When the partial derivatives (31) and (32) are substituted into the above equation, the Nash  
bargaining condition (38) results. Rewrite this as the following relation between the firm’s 
and the worker’s value gain from a match.  
 
 

































(1 ) (1 )(1 )
(1 )
(1 ( ))( )










































Simplify this using the definitions (21) and (28) of the real interest rates for the firm and the 
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Simplify further by introducing the definition (40) of τt, the rate of increase in the wage tax 
wedge:  
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t+1) in the next period by substituting the expressions (35) 
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Appendix B: The main equations formulated in the Troll modeling language 
 
The equations of KIMOD are solved in the Troll modeling language. The model equations 
relating to the labor market have been derived above, but will be repeated here in the form 
they have in the Troll model code. The intention is to provide an easy reference for those 
working with the model, and possibly for others involved in similar projects elsewhere. 
Equation numbers in this section refer to the earlier theoretical treatment.  
 
The four main dynamic equations are:  
 
Unemployment dynamics: (10)  Steady state: (11)  
 
Capital demand:  (22)  Steady state: (24)  
 
Labor demand:  (23)  Steady state: (25)  
 
Wage setting:  (43)  Steady state: (44)  
 
These equations together determine the development of the variables capital Kt, 
unemployment ut, labor market tightness ϑt, and the wage rate Wt. The vacancy rate vt follow 
from vt = ϑt ut. A complete list of equations sufficient to solve the model is: (1) - (6), (10), 
(12), (15), (22), (23), (41), and (43) and their steady state counterparts.  
 
For numerical stability of Troll’s model solving algorithms, it is best to avoid mathematically 
invalid operations during the solution search, such as division by zero, raising negative values 
to fractional powers or taking logarithms of negative values. Thanks to Troll’s backtracking 
capability, attempts at these operations do not necessarily halt the solution process, but may 
yet throw it off track. It is often possible to avoid these operations by expressing the equations 
using logarithms of the original variables.  
 
Therefore, many equations are written in logarithmic form in the Troll model file. The 
logarithmic variables are defined implicitly using the exponential function rather than 
explicitly with the logarithmic function. The variables in question are:  
 
  u = exp(lnu) 
 
  v = exp(lnv) 
 
  theta = exp(lntheta) 
 
  q = exp(lnq) 
 
The logarithmic form of the definition of labor market tightness is:  
 
(5)  lntheta = lnv - lnu 
 
The Cobb-Douglas matching function can simply be expressed as:  
 
(6)  lnq = log(x0) - eta * lntheta 
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The unemployment dynamics equation becomes:  
 
(10)  u = (n*(1+s)–pi*(1–u(-1))) / (n*(1+s+theta*q)) 
 
and its steady state counterpart, also known as the Beveridge curve:  
 
(11)  u = (n*(1+s)–pi) / (n*(1+s+theta*q)-pi) 
 
The first order conditions for the firms’ profit maximization are:  
 
Capital demand:  
 
(22)  mpk(1) + piy(1) * ((1-delta)*(1+2*psi*i(1)/k(1)) +  
  psi*(i(1)/k(1))^2) = (1+r) * piy*(1+2*psi*i/k) 
 
Capital demand, steady state:  
 
(24)  mpk = piy * ((delta+r)*(1+2*psi*i/k) - psi*(i/k)^2) 
 
Labor demand:  
 
(23)  mpl - wpy – (1+s)/q*gamma * wpy =  
  - 1/(1+r) * pi/q(1)*gamma * wpy(1) 
 
Labor demand, steady state:  
 
(25)  mpl = (1 + (1+s-pi*h/(1+r))*gamma/q) * wpy 
 
Wage setting:  
 
(43)  wpy = (beta*mpl + (1–beta)*(1+taue)/((1+taue(-1)) *  
  (1+p)) * lambda * wpy(-1)) / ((1 – beta*gamma*pi *  
  ((1-tau(1))*theta + tau(1)*(1-s)/q))) 
 
Wage setting, steady state:  
 
(44)  wpy = beta*mpl / ((1 – beta*gamma*pi*theta –  
 (1-beta)*lambda/(h*(1+p)))) 
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Appendix C: Unemployment and vacancies in Sweden 1962-2002  
 
Unemployment data is from the Labor Force Survey (LFS) by Statistics Sweden (SCB). 
Vacancies are administrative data from the Swedish National Labour Market Administration 
(AMV). Both are yearly averages in percent of the labor force.  
 
Year Unemployment  Vacancies 
   
1962 1.90  1.00 
1963 1.70  1.12 
1964 1.60  1.27 
1965 1.20  1.44 
1966 1.60  1.18 
1967 2.10  0.86 
1968 2.20  0.95 
1969 1.80  1.48 
1970 1.50  1.59 
1971 2.50  0.91 
1972 2.70  0.80 
1973 2.50  0.89 
1974 2.00  1.21 
1975 1.60  1.22 
1976 1.45  1.12 
1977 1.68  0.91 
1978 2.13  0.82 
1979 1.96  1.16 
1980 1.85  1.25 
1981 2.38  0.69 
1982 3.06  0.46 
1983 3.37  0.48 
1984 3.00  0.66 
1985 2.71  0.83 
1986 2.53  0.89 
1987 2.13  1.05 
1988 1.74  1.17 
1989 1.49  1.13 
1990 1.65  0.89 
1991 2.96  0.41 
1992 5.25  0.24 
1993 8.23  0.19 
1994 7.96  0.28 
1995 7.70  0.35 
1996 8.05  0.33 
1997 8.01  0.39 
1998 6.48  0.55 
1999 5.58  0.61 
2000 4.66  0.81 
2001 3.97  0.62 
2002 3.99  0.67 
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Appendix D: Notation for variables and functions 
 




t    value of a vacancy to the representative firm  
Λ
J,i
t    value of a filled job to firm i  
Λ
U
t    value of unemployment to the representative worker  
Λ
E,i
t    value of employment to worker i  
Πt
i    profits earned by firm i in period t  
Πt    aggregate profits in period t  
α    elasticity of production w.r.t. capital  
β  beta  workers' bargaining power  
γ  gamma  vacancy cost relative to wage  
δ  delta  capital depreciation rate  
εt  epsilon  number of hours worked per worker and year  
η  eta  elasticity of matchings w.r.t. unemployment  
ϑt theta  vt / ut, labor market tightness in period t  
λ  lambda  unemployment benefit replacement ratio  
π  pi  labor force survival rate  
ρt
s    discount factor from period s to t: ρt
t = 1 ; ρt
s+1 = ρt
s / (1 + rs)  
τt  tau  growth rate of wage tax wedge  
τt
e  taue  employer’s wage tax  
τt
w  tauw  employee’s wage tax  
τt
y  tauy  value added tax  
ψ  psi  coefficient for quadratic term in investment cost  
Dt
i    dividends paid by firm i in period t  
Dt    aggregate dividends in period t  
F    production function  
Ht    labor productivity growth factor in period t  
It
i   investments  by  firm  i in period t  
It  i  aggregate investments in period t  
Kt
i    capital in firm i in period t  
Kt  k  aggregate capital in period t  
Lt
i    employment in firm i in period t  
Lt    aggregate employment in period t  
Nt    labor force in period t  
Pt
c    price of consumption good in period t  
Pt
I    price of investment good in period t  
Pt
y    product price in period t  
Rt    nominal interest rate in period t  
Tt    nominal unemployment benefits in period t  
Ut    unemployed workers in period t  
Vt
i    vacancies in firm i in period t  
Vt    aggregate number of vacancies in period t  
VAt    value added in the private sector in period t  
Wt
i    nominal hourly wage in match i in period t  
Wt    nominal hourly wage in period t  
Xt    new matches in period t  
Yt
i    production in firm i in period t  
Yt    aggregate production in period t    29
h  h  average productivity growth rate  
i    index of firms workers or matches 
n  n  labor force growth rate  
pt  p  inflation in the product price: (1+pt) = Pt
y / Pt-1
y  
q(ϑ)  q  rate of filling vacancies  
rt  r  real interest rate in period t: (1 + rt) = (1 + Rt) / (1 + pt+1)  
rt
c    consumer price real interest rate in period t  
s s separation  rate   
t, s    time period index  
ut  u  unemployment rate in period t  
vt  v  vacancy rate in period t  
wt wpy  real  wage  costs in period t: (1+τt
e) εt Wt / Pt
y  
x    matching function  
x0  x0  coefficient in Cobb-Douglas matching function  
F’K,t mpk marginal  productivity of capital in period t  
F’L,t  mpl  marginal productivity of labor in period t  
  piy  price of investment goods relative to product price: Pt
I / Pt
y  
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